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FAILING VICTIMS? THE LIMITS OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN ADDRESSING 
THE NEEDS OF VICTIMS OF VIOLATIONS
Simon Robins*
Abstract
Transitional justice represents itself as both a discourse and practice that exists primarily 
to support victims of human rights violations and gains its moral legitimacy from the 
fact that victims are deserving and the claim that transitional justice has the aim of 
acknowledging victims and providing redress. Here, this claim is interrogated in the 
light of a practice that actually appears to be rooted in liberal state-building and for 
which victims are an essential instrument of prescribed mechanisms of transitional 
justice, such as trials and truth commissions. Evidence is presented that, despite a 
common rhetoric claiming that transitional justice is ‘victim-centred’, its principal 
mechanisms, namely trials and truth commissions, are actually driven by the needs of 
the state. A dominant legalism has seen mechanisms such as prosecution privileged over 
those that serve victims, such as reparation. One result of this institutionalisation of 
transitional justice processes is that victims have little agency in such processes and 
participate as instruments of those mechanisms, rather than on their own terms. Social 
and economic rights remain largely ignored by transitional justice mechanisms, despite 
these being central to both the addressing of victims’ needs and the causes of conl ict. It 
is posited that rather than being driven by victims, transitional justice is an arm of 
global liberal, and ot en neoliberal, governance, sometimes sustaining systems that 
create many of the needs that victims articulate.
Keywords: transitional justice; victims; human rights
1. INTRODUCTION
Transitional justice is now established as an approach that an array of powerful actors 
rel exively turns to when a state is emerging from conl ict or authoritarianism. Rooted 
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in a liberal discourse of human rights and democratisation, transitional justice seeks 
‘to address the past in a constructive future-oriented manner’,1 through dealing with 
legacies of human rights violations in order to prevent their reoccurrence. More than 
this, transitional justice is seen as a set of practices that are not only desirable but 
necessary in order to successfully complete a transition from war or dictatorship to 
peace and democracy. Transitional justice has been dei ned narrowly as ‘the conception 
of justice associated with periods of political change, characterised by legal responses 
to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes’,2 and more broadly as 
‘that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of 
conl ict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and 
dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law’.3 It is worth 
noting that such dei nitions do not, however, reference victims. In practice, the 
mechanisms of transitional justice have long been perceived to have a core of essential 
institutional elements, consisting of trials, truth commissions, reparations processes 
and institutional reform, and a periphery of other mechanisms that include lustration 
processes, memorialisation and educational reform, among others. Whilst founded 
on a legal approach to dei ning violations, the practice of transitional justice has 
expanded to include many non-legal approaches.
A very large range of claims are made for what transitional justice processes can 
achieve, including recovery of the truth, reconciliation, the healing of both individuals 
and the nation, providing justice to victims, the reform of institutions, strengthening 
the rule of law, guaranteeing the non-repetition of human rights violations and 
promoting sustainable peace.4 h ere remains, however, little compelling empirical 
evidence for many of these claims.5
Transitional justice has come to present itself as a discourse and practice that is 
centred on victims, but this is a signii cant evolution from its origins in Latin America 
as very much a state-centred approach to democratisation. h e truth commission 
emerged as a compromise in contexts where judicial process against perpetrators was 
not possible. What has been called the ‘restorative turn’ in transitional justice saw a 
development from conceptualising justice as an alternative to retribution when trials 
were politically impossible, to a dif erent type of justice of greater relevance to states 
in transition, and including restorative as well as retributive approaches. h is maps 
onto the two dominant orientations in contemporary literature on transitional justice: 
1 A. Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation: At er the Violence 2 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
2 R.G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69–94 (2003).
3 N. Roht-Arriaza, h e new landscape of transitional justice. In Roht-Arriaza, Naomi and 
Mariezurrena, Javier (eds.), Transitional justice in the twenty-i rst century: beyond truth versus 
justice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
4 E.g. P. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 
(2nd ed.) (New York: Routledge, 2011).
5 O.N.T. h oms, J. Ron and R. Paris, State-Level Ef ects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know? 
4(3), Intl.Journal of Transitional Justice 329–354 (2010).
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a legalist approach that is normatively driven, and a more pragmatic consequentialist 
approach, premised on achieving certain goals.6
h e truth commission is claimed to be ‘victim-centred’, as a result of this process 
being primarily performative and focussed on victim testimony, institutionalising the 
truth claims of victims through public truth-telling with the social goal of reconnecting 
victims and society.7 What making a transitional justice process victim-centred 
actually means remains unclear, despite the almost universal commitment of 
international actors involved to such a principle. h e UN has discussed ensuring ‘the 
centrality of victims in the design and implementation of transitional justice processes 
and mechanisms’.8 h ere remains a tension, however, in all acknowledgements of the 
centrality of victims in transitional justice processes between victim priorities in 
seeing their needs addressed and a transitional justice practice that has always 
prioritised the building and legitimisation of the liberal state. It is precisely this 
tension that has led to the raising of victim expectations through the use of such 
rhetoric, and then ultimate victim frustration as the mechanisms of transitional 
justice – that remain necessarily state-centric – fail to deliver on them. Despite this, 
the language of victim-centrism has permeated all approaches to transitional justice, 
even around elements such as trials, where addressing victims’ needs would appear to 
be very much a secondary goal. h e Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
has, for example, claimed that ‘the sole raison d’être of the Court’s activities […] is the 
victims and the justice they deserve’.9 h e result of this is that transitional justice 
represents itself as a discourse and practice that exists primarily to support victims of 
human rights violations. It gains its moral legitimacy from the fact that victims are 
deserving and the claim that the practice of transitional justice has the aim of 
acknowledging victims and providing redress.
Transitional justice has both developed from and reinforced a number of 
normative assumptions about what victims of rights violations seek. A ‘rule of law’ 
narrative has sought to assert that victims want punitive justice, and that assumption 
is used to support the primacy of prosecutions, while restorative approaches have 
been accompanied by claims that victims are willing to forgive perpetrators who 
confess, or that they merely seek acknowledgement and symbolic reparations. h e 
challenge for a global discourse of transitional justice, typically instantiated in a 
limited set of institutional mechanisms, is both to address the needs of victims 
6 L. Vinjamuri and J. Snyder, Advocacy and scholarship in the study of international war crime 
tribunals and transitional justice, 7 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 345–362 (2004).
7 M. Humphrey, From Victim to Victimhood: Truth Commissions and Trials as Rituals of Political 
Transition and Individual Healing, 14 (2) h e Australian Journal of Anthropology 171–187 (2003).
8 UN, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice 
(New York: UN, 2010).
9 Statement to the Press by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, 20  July 2013). https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20
releases/Pages/statement-otp-20–07–2013.aspx.
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ef ectively in a wide range of dif erent and culturally diverse contexts and to address 
victims of a wide range of types of violation. In addition to diverse victim 
experiences and needs, ot en victims’ demands will evolve in response to the 
passing of time and the emergence of mechanisms that claim to address their needs, 
as well as to the developing social, economic and political environment of a 
transitional state.
Empirical data collected from victims and af ected communities at er conl ict 
coni rm that they articulate a range of ot en complex and context-dependent 
demands.10 During and in the immediate at ermath of conl ict, a demand for security 
and basic needs is most ot en articulated, rel ecting the insecurity and poverty that 
accompanies conl ict and the fact that victims are likely to come from communities 
that suf ered from pre-existing poverty and disempowerment and live in states where 
services are limited: ‘the fact remains that if one’s stomach is empty, if one does not 
have shelter or access to medical care when needed, the right to truth and accountability, 
among other civil and political rights, may seem a luxury’.11 A failure of transitional 
justice to engage with basic needs such as those for food, health and education 
demonstrates the gap that exists between victims’ needs as they are articulated and 
what a transitional justice framework seeks to deliver. h e broader neglect of social 
and economic rights in transitional justice is discussed further below. It is also clear 
that victimhood has emotional, psychological and social impacts that transitional 
justice theory and practice have largely neglected.
h is article will summarise contemporary critiques of the victim orientation of 
transitional justice in terms of its ef ectiveness in addressing the needs of victims. h e 
i rst section will discuss the extent to which the core mechanisms of transitional 
justice (trials, truth commissions, reparations) address victims’ needs, while the 
second will discuss the tensions between the broader discourse of transitional justice 
and victims’ aspirations.
10 A range of empirical studies have informed the ‘victim turn’ in transition justice, exemplii ed by 
empirical studies of victims’ needs using largely qualitative but also quantitative approaches. 
Examples include: P. Pham and P. Vinck, Empirical Research and the Development and Assessment 
of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 1(2) h e International Journal of Transitional Justice, 231–248; 
S. Robins, Families of the Missing: A Test for Contemporary Approaches to Transitional Justice 
(New York / London: RoutledgeGlasshouse, 2013); G. Millar, An Ethnographic Approach to 
Peacebuilding: Understanding Local Experiences in Transitional States (Routledge: London, 2014). 
Additionally, Pham and Vinck have made a number of empirical studies, including in Uganda, D.R. 
Congo and Cambodia, that sought to interrogate attitudes to peace and justice that of er an excellent 
route to understanding the needs of victims in the absence of the assumption of any prior agenda, 
e.g. P.N. Pham, P, Vinck, M. Wierde and E. Stover, Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of 
Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda, (Berkeley: Human Rights Center, UC 
Berkeley, 2005).
11 H. Saeed, Victims and victimhood in Afghanistan, 10 (1) h e International Journal of Transitional 
Justice. 168–178. (2016).
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2. VICTIMS AND THE CORE MECHANISMS OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice has become increasingly prescriptive as its practice has become 
both widespread and sanctioned by an industry of practitioners and specialist 
agencies. What has become a global practice has emphasised the mechanisms of trials, 
truth commissions and reparation processes, and one result of an increasingly 
mimetic practice has been an institutionalisation of transitional justice process, where 
the creation of state or supra-state bodies is seen as its core role. Given that most 
contemporary transitional justice processes unfold in low-income states in the global 
South, such institutions serve to distance transitional justice process and ‘to see 
victims or violence-af ected communities as constituencies which must be managed 
rather than citizens to whom they must be accountable’.12 Several studies demonstrate 
the limits of such institutions in achieving even the narrowest goals of transitional 
justice and the extent to which they reinforce ownership of the process by the state 
and elites.13 Many in post-conl ict states in Africa and Asia, and in particular the 
most marginalised in those states, live in worlds where local institutions, including 
the primary institutions of family and community, are more relevant to all aspects of 
their lives than those of the state in a remote capital.
An institutional approach necessarily restricts the interest of a transitional justice 
process to the minority of victims whose cases will be brought before some formal 
mechanism. Such approaches, premised on a Western model of ‘liberal proceduralism’,14 
are remote from the communities they claim to serve. Such approaches have been 
challenged by those who assert that recovery from conl ict must be rooted in an 
understanding of how mass violations have impacted on and transformed af ected 
populations. In extreme cases, we see communities and victims – in contexts such as 
Cambodia and Timor-Leste – who are unaware that a national judicial process or 
truth commission has even happened.15 Questions of access, to national as well as the 
international processes that are most globally visible, are a huge challenge in many 
contexts, not just due to physical or geographical constraints but because such 
institutions can address only a small number of victims. Seeking that such processes 
12 K. McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a h icker Understanding of Transitional Justice, 34 (4) 
Journal of Law and Society 411–440 (2007).
13 Supra note 10, p. 3.
14 P. Gready and S. Robins, From Transitional to Transformative Justice, 8  (3) h e International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 339–361 (2014).
15 S. Robins, Challenging the h erapeutic Ethic: A Victim-Centred Evaluation of Transitional Justice 
Process in Timor-Leste, 6 (1) h e International Journal of Transitional Justice, 83–105 (2012); P. N. 
Pham, P. Vinck, M. Balthazard, J. Strasser and C. Om, Justice for victims in trials of mass crimes: 
Symbolism or substance?, 21 (2) International Review of Victimology 161–185 (2015).
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provide recognition and redress to conl ict-af ected communities leads to a form of 
justice that unintentionally produces exclusions, deferrals and marginalisations.16
As a result of being centred on a few core mechanisms, in any particular time and 
place discussion of transitional justice is constrained by the already existing set of 
tools established in other (possibly unrelated) transitional contexts. One threat this 
presents is that the task of addressing past legacies of rights violations may be 
assumed to be limited to a i nite number of well-dei ned transitional justice 
mechanisms, labelled as such. h is has led to an extensive literature in which the 
impact of transitional justice mechanisms is evaluated in detachment from the 
broader social and political context, resulting in an overemphasis on the importance 
of such mechanisms in comparison with the end of conl ict and the wider political, 
social and economic impact of peace and the political processes that accompany it. 
Victims are likely to be far more strongly impacted by the social, economic and 
political circumstances in which they live every day than a remote and short-lived 
institution.
2.1. TRIALS
It is almost universally presumed that prosecutions benei t victims and that impunity 
is in itself traumatic for survivors. Despite these claims, there has been little empirical 
work on the issue of whether prosecutions of violators are of benei t to the victims of 
those tried. Indeed, one of the few scholars to address the issue calls this an ‘intellectual 
void’.17 O’Connell interviewed therapists and human rights lawyers who had worked 
with victims of violations (largely in Argentina and Chile) to determine the ef ect 
trials had on victims. His conclusions are that impunity inl icts ‘psychological pain’ 
and that trials can be cathartic and provide acknowledgement through the breaking 
of social silence. However, trials could also retraumatise victims and perpetrators 
failing to be convicted was highly traumatic. h ose victims who participated in trials, 
as plaintif s, witnesses or deponents, felt dif erent ef ects. Some victims describe the 
process as ‘validating’, with one saying power ‘l owed back from the accused to me’.18 
Other scholars, however, deny that there is any therapeutic element for victims in 
trials,19 while Hamber claims that the context in which testimony is given is crucial 
16 S. Kendall, Beyond the Restorative Turn: h e Limits of Legal Humanitarianism, in C. De Vos, S. 
Kendall, and C. Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: the Politics and Practice of International Criminal 
Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
17 J. O’Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console h eir 
Victims? 46 (2) Harvard International Law Journal 295–346 (2005).
18 E. Stover, Witnesses and the promise of justice in the Hague. In Stover, Eric and Weinstein, Harvey 
M. (eds.), My neighbour, my enemy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 118–119.
19 L. E. Fletcher and H. Weinstein, Violence and social repair: Rethinking the contribution of justice 
to reconciliation, 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573–639 (2002).
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and that a trial is ot en not the best environment.20 O’Connell concludes that many 
victims are potentially damaged by giving testimony in an adversarial process, while 
some who had themselves fought for and found justice claimed that it changed them 
positively. He concludes that judicial action should not be considered a ‘healing’ 
experience for victims on the basis of current evidence, and that attention should be 
paid to non-judicial alternatives to address victims’ psychological needs.
2.2. TRUTH COMMISSIONS
h e truth commission claims to deliver both individual and national healing through 
truth-telling, specii cally by institutionalising the truth claims of victims. h e trope of 
truth as reconciliation underlies a broad range of recent transitional mechanisms and 
yet appears to be rooted in little empirically tested practice. Despite the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) having been the object of huge study, 
rather little data is available about how its work is perceived by victims.21 h e most 
comprehensive study of victims’ responses to the TRC suggested that victims 
expressed the view that their role in the TRC process was not sui  cient and that they 
would be interested in meeting with perpetrators – an echo of the idea of encounter 
that is a pillar of restorative justice.22
h e real goal of a truth commission is the transformation of traumatic memory 
into therapeutic history.23 h is social engineering is achieved through victims’ 
testimony, legitimated by their suf ering, creating new narratives for states to build 
their legitimacy upon. As such, truth commissions operate through the continuing 
objectii cation of the victim to support the broader aims of the state. Although there 
is a link between the plight of individuals and inter-communal reconciliation, care 
should be taken not to conl ate the concepts of individual and societal healing.24 
For individual victims it is unclear that participation in such a process is positive.25 
20 B. Hamber, h e Need for a Survivor-Centered Approach to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Community Mediation Update, 9 (Community Dispute Resolution Trust, 
Johannesburg, South Africa), Jan. 1996, at 5, available at www.csvr.org.za/wits/articles/artrcdrt.
htm [Accessed 05/04/11].
21 See however the edited collection: A. R. Chapman and H. van der Merwe (eds) Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2008).
22 Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Survivors’ Perceptions of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and Suggestions for the Final Report (1998).].
23 C. J. Colvin, ‘Brothers and Sisters, Do Not be Afraid of Me’: Trauma, History and the therapeutic 
imagination in the new South Africa. In K. Hodgkin and S. Radstone (eds.), Contested pasts: the 
politics of memory. (London: Routledge, 2003).
24 J. Doak, h e h erapeutic Dimension of Transitional Justice: Emotional Repair and Victim 
Satisfaction in International Trials and Truth Commissions, 11 International Criminal Law Review 
263–298 (2011).
25 D. Summeri eld, A critique of seven assumptions behind psychological trauma programmes in war-
af ected areas. 48(10) Soc Sci Med., 1449–1462 (1999); M. Eisenbruch, From post-traumatic stress 
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h e emergence of trauma as the lens through which to understand societies 
emerging from mass violence is dominated by approaches that co-opt psychoanalytic 
concepts of cathartic release and apply them to societies as a collective.26 Imposing 
the frame of trauma on victims implies a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder 
and a consequent need for ‘therapy’, in contrast to potentially more relevant and 
local understandings of how they might respond to the impact of victimisation. 
h is entirely Western lens largely neglects alternative approaches to addressing the 
impact of conl ict, privileging prescriptive solutions imported from a global 
discourse that ‘analyses political, economic and social issues in terms of cycles of 
emotional dysfunction’.27 Additionally, the therapeutic ethos implies that once 
truth has been told and its performative role is complete, the victim (like the nation) 
will be cured.28 In practice, such testimony can as ot en be damaging as therapeutic 
and at er victims have disappeared from the national stage that a Truth Commission 
provides, their suf ering continues.29 Victimisation clearly has the potential to be 
accompanied by emotional and psychological impacts that can be severe, but 
transitional justice has yet to make psychosocial support to victims central to its 
practice, despite continuing reference to the therapeutic capacity of public 
testimony.
A Truth Commission necessarily individualises victims in ways which divorce 
them both from their communities (membership of which was very ot en the reason 
they became victims and which represent the most accessible source of support and 
solidarity) and from the political and other motivations of the violence to which they 
were subject.
2.3. REPARATIONS
In many transitional contexts reparations may be the most tangible manifestation of 
the state addressing harms suf ered by victims of conl ict.30 Reparation also has a 
signii cant socio-political role, to impact on the broader society through the drawing 
of a line under past violations and the reinforcing of a commitment to the rule of law. 
disorder to cultural bereavement: Diagnosis of Southeast Asian refugees, 33(6): Social Science & 
Medicine, 673–680 (1991).
26 D. Summeri eld, Cross cultural perspectives on the medicalisation of human suf ering. In G. Rosen 
(ed.), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Issues and Controversies. (London: John Wiley, 2004).
27 V. Pupavac, Human security and the rise of global therapeutic governance, 5(2), Conl ict, Security & 
Development 161 – 181 (2005).
28 Colvin, Supra note 23, p. 6.
29 D. Silove, A.B. Zwi, Anthony B. and D. le Touze, Do truth commissions heal? h e East Timor 
experience, 367 h e Lancet 1222 – 1223 (2006); T. de Ridder, h e Trauma of Testifying: Deponents’ 
dii  cult healing process, 6 (3 & 4) Track Two (1997).].
30 P. de Grief , Repairing the past: Compensation for victims of human rights violations. In P. de Grief  
(ed.), h e Handbook of Reparations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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Indeed, it is seen that the reparative demands of victims ot en demand the changing 
of state behaviour.
Reparations are an approach to political violence that attempt to link the addressing 
of individual needs – emotional, psychological and livelihood-related – with norm-
setting processes in society that aid recovery. Reparations are the one mechanism that 
should be intrinsically victim-centred and such ef orts will fail to be reparative if 
victim needs are not considered. Yet very ot en reparation schemes fail to consider 
victims’ wishes in their design and implementation.31 h e literature of reparation 
consistently blurs boundaries between the rights of victims as outlined in legal 
instruments and their needs as they express them. h e UN Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims do not mention the word ‘need’, but state that ‘[r]eparation should be 
proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suf ered’.32 h is is an 
acknowledgement that needs must play a role, even though there is a reluctance for the 
rights vocabulary to accommodate such language on the understanding that it is the 
violation that creates a right to reparation and not the harm suf ered.
Reparation, whilst potentially providing material compensation to victims, is 
primarily about acknowledgment of what has happened and the responsibility for it, 
and is thus intimately linked to concepts of truth; in some contexts, victims seek that 
the state or perpetrators themselves provide such recognition. h e i nancial component 
is a way of demonstrating this and not an end in itself. h us, reparation can have a 
benei cial ef ect on victims as part of the rehabilitative process, although the impact of 
reparations on victims is little studied. A major gap in the literature is in the area of 
follow-up studies of survivors who have (or have not) received reparation. In the 
absence of studies into the ef ects of reparation, one is faced with speculation and 
generalisations.33
One study of ex-political prisoners in the Czech Republic showed that only a 
minority of victims was satisi ed with i nancial reparation, but that money increased 
access to rehabilitation and symbolised social acknowledgement and justice.34 A 
review of reparations processes suggests that reparation that prioritises action by 
perpetrators rather than the recovery of victims replicates the role of victims as 
passive objects: ‘programs that enable victims to play a part in critical societal 
31 C. Waterhouse, h e good, the bad and the ugly: Moral Agency and h e Role of Victims in 
Reparations Programs. 31(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 257–
294 (2007).
32 United Nations General Assembly Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985. New York: 
UN General Assembly. (1985) (7: IX, 15).
33 S. Cullinan, Torture Survivors’ Perceptions of Reparation: Preliminary Survey, (London: h e 
REDRESS Trust, 2001): 50.
34 R. David and S. Choi Yuk-ping, Victims on Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Reparation of 
Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic, 27 Human Rights Quarterly 392–435 (2005).
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institutions of er a more thorough remedy to past harms by fostering victims’ moral 
agency’.35 Victim agency in transitional justice processes is discussed below.
One of the greatest challenges to reparations achieving their potential in addressing 
victims’ needs is the failure of such processes to occur. In many cases truth 
commissions have recommended a comprehensive reparations process and authorities 
have chosen not to implement it. In other instances, reparations programmes are 
insui  ciently funded and thus fail to meet their objectives. Reparations remain the 
poor relation of transitional justice mechanisms, in terms of funding, broader support 
and even academic interest, despite having the potential to have the greatest impact 
on victims.
3. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PRACTICE
3.1. LEGALISM IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Law remains the dominant discipline in which transitional justice is situated, despite 
the fruitful engagement of a diverse range of disciplines with the issues at its core. As 
a result, transitional justice has been accused of having become ‘overdominated by a 
narrow legalistic lens’36 that has led to a ‘thin’ transitional justice that is 
institutionalised and driven by legal processes. h is echoes broader critiques of 
legalism in other i elds: ‘[L]egalism […] has led to the construction of rigid systems 
of formal dei nitions. […] h is procedure has served to isolate law completely from 
the social context in which it exists.’37 h e isolation from the social that legalism 
implies serves to alienate the practice of transitional justice from victims whose 
needs, experience and agency are entirely rooted in the social worlds in which they 
live.
Despite the rhetoric of restoration that has permeated transitional justice, 
prosecution remains a mechanism that is privileged above all others. h is is 
rel ected in the devotion of very substantial resources to tribunals (national, 
international and hybrid), which ot en dwarf spending on mechanisms – such as 
reparations – which directly address victims’ needs. h is echoes a legal absolutism 
that has overturned previous thinking that mechanisms such as the truth 
commission were an alternative to trials, and now presents the prosecution of 
serious crimes as an obligation of states. Individual prosecution has become the 
overwhelming emphasis in the practice of transitional justice and is credited with 
the ability to deliver on a large range of goals despite the lack of empirical support 
35 Waterhouse, Supra n,31, p.8.
36 K. McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a h icker Understanding of Transitional Justice, 34 (4) 
Journal of Law and Society 411–440 (2007). 412.
37 J. N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986): 2.
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for such claims. An extreme view is that prosecution and victim redress are one 
and the same thing: ‘Victim redress amounts to holding individual perpetrators 
criminally accountable for human rights violations and violations of international 
humanitarian law. Punishment itself is seen as a form of redress.’38 h is lawyerly 
fantasy superimposes upon the complexity of post-conl ict contexts a single 
dominant approach to transition that claims unique importance to victims, despite 
the massive diversity of ways in which violence is experienced. It homogenises the 
many complex and varied demands of victims, arising from their unique 
experiences of conl ict, into something that can be addressed by a single institution. 
It is also readily contradicted by a mass of empirical data concerning victims’ 
needs.39
Because of the primacy of prosecution in legalist rights discourse, ef orts to 
understand victims’ priorities have ot en been distorted to i t such assumptions.40 
However, when studies are performed with an unbiased methodology it is seen that a 
desire for prosecution is ot en only one of many demands, and frequently not the i rst 
priority of victims of violations, at least in states where other needs remain urgent.41 
h e prevalence of legalism has resulted in debates in transitional justice being centred 
on the extent to which retributive justice is possible in the light of a need for peace to 
be sustained,42 despite the potential lack of priority given by victims to such process. 
An emphasis on law and the legal skews debates in directions led by lawyers and 
human rights workers, rather than by victims of violations, or even by the broader 
needs of societies emerging from conl ict.
Legalism also serves to translate ‘thick’ issues, deeply embedded in the history 
and culture of a context, into ‘thin’ legal representations. h is facilitates a mimetic 
approach, allowing external experts to present prescriptive solutions derived from a 
global discourse as solutions to the dilemmas of transition. Several studies have 
shown that such approaches, driven by an abstract discourse of rights, fail to address 
the principal needs of victims, largely as a result of their being divorced from the 
social basis of those needs.43 Legalism is articulated through a rights discourse that 
is seen as emphasising justice claims precisely because of its base in law and claims 
to universality. It is, however, this very universality that reduces the capacity of law 
38 Discussing the work of Teitel in S. Kendall, Beyond the Restorative Turn: the Limits of Legal 
Humanitarianism, in C. De Vos, S. Kendall, and C. Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: the Politics and 
Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015).
39 Supra note 10, p.4.
40 E.g. S. Robins, Whose voices? Understanding victims’ views in transition, 1(2) Journal of Human 
Rights Practice, 320–33 (2009).
41 Supra note 10, p.3.
42 E.g. J. Snyder and L. Vinjamuri, Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime 
Tribunals and Transitional Justice, 7 Annual Review of Political Science 345–362 (2004).
43 Supra note 10. p.3.
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to address needs that emerge from a very specii c and local set of circumstances: 
rights has become such a dominant emancipatory vocabulary that it makes others 
invisible. For a truly victim-centred approach, normative criteria and universalist 
rights claims must be complemented as the sole basis for addressing needs with 
what victims perceive will aid most in their recovery from the impact of the 
violation.
3.2. AN EXCLUSIVE VICTIMHOOD
In principle, a victim is dei ned as such by what has been done to them, with this 
codii ed in the violations dei ned by various bodies of law. In practice, victimhood 
does not emerge naturally from the experience of being harmed, but is constructed 
socially and subjectively, with a range of factors determining who will be accorded 
victim status. Rombouts and Vandeginste call these ‘public recognition selection 
processes’,44 in which some ‘have the ‘power’ to enforce recognition (socially and 
legally)’. Most formally, transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions 
or prosecutorial bodies, will determine who is considered a victim, with victimhood 
in this sense an identity that is regulated through jurisdictional standards, such as 
time and place and the subject matter of crimes.45 More locally, in many contexts 
victims’ groups and NGOs will engage with victims and dei ne criteria that may 
impact on understandings of victimhood within communities.
Victims demand a diversity of responses and understand justice dif erently, but 
i nd themselves confronted with an inl exible transnational discourse that seeks 
‘objective’ dei nitions of both victims and the appropriate responses to their 
experience. In practice, victims constitute a part of the contested terrain of the 
memory of the conl ict, at both national and local levels, ot en creating a hierarchy of 
victimhood that may be validated or repudiated by a formal mechanism. h e truth 
commission represents the formalisation of this process, in which victim memory is 
transformed into public knowledge, sanctioned by authority. In some contexts, 
victims must be ‘innocent’ to be worthy of the appellation: in Peru, for example, 
anyone who had been a member of the Maoist guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso was 
excluded from being considered for reparation, regardless of violations to which they 
may have been subject.
Most perniciously, transitional justice has largely excluded victims of the structural 
violence of social and economic rights violations from its purview, understanding 
justice as linked almost exclusively to violations of bodily integrity. h is is a direct 
result of the liberal roots of the discourse and is discussed below.
44 H. Rombouts and S. Vandeginste Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights 
Violations: h e Notion of Victim. h ird World Legal Studies 89 – 114. (2000–2003).
45 Kendall, Supra n.16, p.5.
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3.3. VICTIM AGENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE
Agency is considered important because it rel ects an ethical imperative: ‘h e doctrine 
of action has become essential to our recognition of other people’s humanity’.46 Agency 
is understood primarily as the autonomy of the subject, both as individual and 
community: the sense in which victims are in control of their own destiny and are 
agents in processes to address their needs. Victims are subordinate not only because of 
their victimhood, but in many cases prior to their victimisation for reasons of 
marginalisation by poverty, gender or ethnicity. h eir needs ot en result from the 
conl uence of long-term marginalisation and the violations of conl ict; it is thus crucial 
that victims themselves have agency and voice in the process to address these impacts, 
and this has become a staple of the international rhetoric around transitional justice. 
h is challenges the use of the term accountability, currently understood as accountability 
to law, with the concept of a transitional justice process that is accountable to victims.
What distinguishes rights from needs is that while both of er analyses of dei cits 
that impact on human life, needs are a simple articulation of that dei cit, while rights 
provide a tool for action. Rights are asserted to empower their subjects and since they 
are actively claimed they are understood to give victims agency.47 Critics of the rights 
discourse, however, see it as constructing victims as subjects on the terms of the 
atrocities committed against them:48 victims are perceived as dei ned by their 
experience and its codii cation in law in a way that denies them agency over their own 
identity. Scholars from post-colonial states have taken this critique further: Mutua 
uses the metaphor of ‘saviours’, in which those with access to the rights discourse 
intervene to redeem victims.49 h e impact of this for the subject of rights, the victim, 
is that her subjectivity is constructed entirely upon the basis of this external discourse. 
Mamdani echoes this, seeing the rights discourse as representing victims as ‘wards 
needing Protection’, constituting ‘a depoliticising discourse whose ef ect is to transfer 
agency from victims to their “protectors”’.50
In the highly unequal societies in which much contemporary transitional justice 
process unfolds, rights constitute a discourse that is preferentially available to the 
46 T. Asad, Comments on conversion. In P. van der Meer (ed.) Conversion to modernities: h e 
globalization of Christianity. (New York: Routledge, 1996).
47 E.g. M. Ignatief , Human rights as idolatry. In M. Ignatief , Michael. K. A. Appiah and A. Gutmann 
(eds.) Human rights as politics and idolatry. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
48 M. Humphrey, Reconciliation and the h erapeutic State, 26(3) Journal of Intercultural Studies 203 
– 220 (2005).
49 M. Mutua, Savages, victims and saviors: h e metaphor of human rights, 42 Harv. Int’l Law Journal 
201–246 (2001).
50 M. Mamdani, Response to Gonzalez-Cueva, Eduardo: review of M. Mamdani, Saviors and 
Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror, 3(3) International Journal of Transitional Justice 
470–473 (2009).
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powerful: rights are saturated with what Habermas described as a ‘technocratic 
consciousness’51 and this serves to restrict access to such discourse, which can become 
a tool for power to be exercised, potentially denying the disempowered agency. 
Additionally, rights are mediated by the actors who articulate them: in an unequal 
society, as with any other discourse, they become subject to existing power relations. 
h is is a demonstration of the disjuncture between the epistemology of human rights 
and the social ontologies in which they are embedded.52 Privileging discourse alien to 
victims, such as that of rights, can empower elites and outsiders at the expense of 
victims, particularly the most disempowered, who have both the greatest need of and 
least access to the language of rights. In a state where only elites know what rights are, 
they can become something that are largely claimed on behalf of victims rather than 
by victims themselves. h e result is that victims must be represented by human rights 
experts, substituting empowerment for passivity and dependence upon others.53
h e restorative turn in transitional justice has emerged in parallel with the 
recognition of victims’ rights as of central importance to a transitional justice process, 
and restorative approaches are seen as natural complements to the accountability-
driven process of trials. h ere is a tension, however, between the idea of a process 
centred on the needs of victims and an increasingly prescriptive global approach to 
transitional justice. h e understanding of victim participation in transitional justice 
processes is at the heart of this dilemma: as the essential elements of a process have 
become increasingly standardised, what room is there for these to be impacted in 
form and implementation by victims’ agendas? In practice, participation has been 
distilled into demands for national consultations, which, in most contexts, have had 
rather minimal impact on the subsequent unfolding of processes very much moulded 
on the global model.
Participation in transitional justice processes is understood in a wide variety of 
ways that can be conceptualised in terms of typologies of the quality and extent of 
participation. h e literature around participation, notably in development, perceives 
participation as concerned with the expansion of agency and thus with processes of 
empowerment: the challenging of power relations which exclude certain categories of 
people from playing particular roles in a process. Ultimately, such participation of ers 
the prospect of transformation for both victims and processes. White has dei ned a 
ladder of participation, representing ascending degrees of participation.54
51 J. Habermas, Towards a rational society. (London: Heinemann Hamilton, 1971). 112 – 113.
52 M. Goodale, Introduction: Locating rights, envisioning law between the global and the local. In M. 
Goodale and S. A. Merry (eds), h e practice of human rights: tracking law between the global and the 
local. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
53 T. Madlingozi, On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims, 2 (2) Journal 
of Human Rights Practice 208–228 (2010).
54 S. White, ‘Depoliticising Development: h e Uses and Abuses of Participation, in J. Pearce (ed.) 
Development, NGOs, and Civil Society: Selected Essays from Development in Practice (Oxford: 
Oxfam, 1996); S. R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 (4) JAIP 216–224 (1969).
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h e institutional approaches to transitional justice that emerge from the standard 
global framework, despite making ot en extravagant claims for victim engagement, can 
be seen to be almost exclusively nominal or instrumental in how victims participate, 
delivering little to victims but ot en being necessary for a process to occur. Victim 
representation sometimes occurs in truth commissions or around consultations to steer 
transitional justice processes, but this has not become standard practice. It remains the 
case that as long as the nature and form of transitional justice mechanisms are prescribed 
by global practice, implemented by national elites and constrained by legalist approaches, 
a transformative approach to victim participation – and true victim agency – is 
impossible. A transformative approach is to ensure that change is made by empowering 
victims themselves, rather than by others acting on their behalf, permitting victims to 
engage on their own terms in ways that are empowering, and providing a route to 
political change driven by victims. Such consultative processes are the i rst step towards 
challenging top-down process with perspectives ‘from below’. Such an approach has 
been articulated as ‘transitional justice from the bottom up’55 and a need to ‘explore ways 
in which […] institutions of transitional justice can broaden ownership and encourage 
the participation of those who have been most directly af ected by the conl ict’.56
3.4. THE NEGLECT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Whilst the rights discourse claims to address all rights equally, in practice civil and 
political rights are prioritised over others, notably the social, economic and cultural, 
and this is especially true in transitional justice.57 In principle, there is ‘interdependence 
and indivisibility’ of all rights, but in both the global rights discourse and in praxis, 
social, economic and cultural rights are far less emphasised. h is is seen where victims 
of conl ict are cast as such, overshadowing the broader needs that both pre-existed the 
conl ict and that are exacerbated by the impact of the violation. h e ef ective hierarchy 
of rights, which subjugates victims’ own perceptions of their priorities to an agenda 
that elevates civil and political rights, drives legalistic approaches to transitional 
justice. Constraining victim identity to deriving exclusively from the violence of 
conl ict neglects the structural violence of poverty and marginalisation, despite 
evidence that many victims prioritise exactly the basic needs that are marginalised by 
the rights discourse.58 h us, rights come with their own priorities, which serve not 
55 K. McEvoy and L. McGregor, Transitional justice from below: An agenda for research, policy and 
praxis. In K. McEvoy and L. McGregor (eds.) Transitional justice from below: Grassroots activism 
and the struggle for change. (Oxford: Hart, 2008).
56 Ibid: 5, emphasis in original.
57 L. Arbour, Economic and social justice for societies in transition, 40 NYU Journal of International 
law and politics, 1–27 (2007).
58 R. Rubio-Marin, h e Gender of Reparations: Setting the Agenda. In R. Rubio-Marin (ed.), What 
Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008).
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only to reduce victim agency but to depoliticise the discussion of peacebuilding, 
marginalising agendas of social and economic justice in favour of a legalism that 
privileges the civil and political.
Even where potential compensation and economic support for victims is discussed, 
this is invariably framed in terms of a legally based ‘right to reparation’, essentially 
reframing the issue as a civil/political right. h at social and economic rights are 
secondary has been implicitly acknowledged, in principle in recognition of developing 
states’ challenges in realising such rights, through the concept of ‘progressive 
realisation’59 of social and economic rights. In transitional justice, the lack of emphasis 
globally on social and economic rights has been acknowledged at the highest level:
By reaching beyond its criminal law-rooted mechanisms to achieve social justice, 
transitional justice could contribute to expand our traditional and reductive understanding 
of ‘justice’ by rendering it its full meaning.60
While human rights has become a central pillar of development work and civil society 
globally has engaged with rights-based approaches, in transitional justice practice 
human rights agencies in particular have proved themselves unable or unwilling to 
articulate the economic and social needs of victims and to challenge entrenched 
hierarchies that ensure most remain poor. h e retributive roots of transitional justice 
and the narrow agenda of its practitioners continue to prevent the emergence of a 
practice that can deliver a broader justice at er conl ict that includes addressing the 
social injustice that led to conl ict and thus address the broad needs of victims.
4. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS GLOBAL LIBERAL 
DISCOURSE
Transitional justice has become a globally dominant lens through which to approach 
states addressing legacies of a violent past, most ot en implemented as a component of 
larger ef orts at liberal state-building. A global community of agencies and donors – 
including powerful states – exists that seeks to mobilise the rights discourse to 
advance a particular agenda in political transition, following global mimetic practice. 
Transitional justice has been disseminated as an integral part of the globalisation of a 
set of human rights norms linked to liberalism and neoliberalism and has become 
part of a hegemonic discourse that links development and peacebuilding to a liberal 
state-building project that sees liberal democracy and open markets as its endpoint.
Transitional justice uses a narrow legalism to ignore the politics that underlie 
situations that are the result of unequal power relations: ‘legalism […] incessantly 
59 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Article 2.
60 Arbour, Supra n.57 at p. 14.
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translates wide-ranging political questions into more narrowly framed legal 
questions’.61 h is result is a human rights regime that has:
[A] Western centric and top-down focus; it self presents (at least) as apolitical; it includes a 
capacity to disconnect from the real political and social world of transition […] and i nally 
it suggests a predominant focus upon retribution as the primary mechanism to achieve 
accountability.62
As such, rights work in conjunction with existing social and economic power relations 
as a regulatory discourse, at once normalising certain relations of power and co-opting 
more radical political demands.63 As a consequence, transitional justice becomes an 
arm of global liberal, and ot en neoliberal, governance, sometimes sustaining systems 
that create many of the needs that victims articulate. h e evidence of a signii cant 
body of empirical data is that the global transitional justice discourse, prioritising 
trials and national truth processes, fails to address the most important needs of 
victims. Meanwhile, a legalist perspective has led to a normative bias that has 
permitted transitional justice to resist this evidence base and empiricism more 
generally.
5. CONCLUSIONS
It has been argued here that there is a fundamental tension at the heart of the goals 
articulated by transitional justice advocates. Whilst the discourse has become 
something that sustains a global project to reconstruct states – particularly those in 
the global South – in Western liberal democratic terms, it continues to claim that 
victims of violations are at the centre of its practice. h e empirical evidence reviewed 
here suggests that despite the claim of victim-centrism, transitional justice does not in 
practice ef ectively address the needs of victims as they prioritise them. h e use of the 
charisma of victims as a justii cation for the necessity and value of transitional justice 
appears to be an ef ort to legitimise it and serves to aid its presentation as a technical 
and non-political practice. One impact of this is to raise signii cant expectations in 
victim communities that are rarely satisi ed, and as a consequence victim 
disenchantment has become a given in many recent transitional justice contexts.
Victims have become a fetish in transitional justice, fetishism being concerned 
with the dif erence between subjects and objects. While the language of participation 
and agency is increasingly used to describe the relationship between victims and 
61 W. Brown and J. Halley. Let  Legalism / Let  Critique (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 
2002): 19.
62 McEvoy and McGregor. Supra n. 55 at pp.14–24.
63 S. Speed, At the Crossroads of Human Rights and Anthropology: Toward a Critically Engaged 
Activist Research, 108(1) American Anthropologist 66–76 (2008).
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processes of transitional justice, they remain almost entirely their object with no 
capacity to exert signii cant impact on a prescribed process that unfolds according to 
a global model, largely unchanged by rituals of consultation. h ere remains no 
consensus on the role of the victim in transitional justice despite the rhetoric that 
surrounds her, while the structural limitations of the dominant mechanisms of trials 
and truth commissions accommodate victims only as nominal or instrumental actors. 
Instrumentalisation appears to be the dei ning characteristic of the relationship 
between victims and the mechanisms of transitional justice: such institutions require 
victims, but the benei ts to victims of their role appear limited.
h e gulf between the demands of victims and what transitional justice processes 
deliver are encapsulated by the dif erence between procedural justice and the 
substantive justice sought by victims that sees changes in their everyday lives. A truly 
victim-centred approach is likely to demand moving reparation from the periphery to 
the centre of transitional justice and building processes that can deliver repair and 
healing to victims on their terms. h is would include making psychosocial approaches 
central, rather than seeking to justify the therapeutic value of mechanisms deigned to 
advance the interests of the state. It will also demand the challenging of purely 
institutional approaches, which are necessarily exclusive and remote, and embracing 
an actor-oriented approach that is driven by victims.
